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INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), as amended, assigned the Department of 
Energy (DOE) responsibility for developing and managing a Federal system for the disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The Office of Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for accepting, transporting, and 
disposing of SNF and HLW at the Yucca Mountain repository (if licensed) in a manner that 
protects public health, safety, and the environment; enhances national and energy security; and 
merits public confidence.  
OCRWM faces a near-term challenge—to develop and demonstrate a transportation system that 
will sustain safe and efficient shipments of SNF and HLW to a repository. To better inform and 
improve its current planning, OCRWM has extensively reviewed plans and other documents 
related to past high-visibility shipping campaigns of SNF and other radioactive materials within 
the United States. This report summarizes the results of this review and, where appropriate, 
lessons learned.
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The objective of this lessons learned study was to identify successful, best-in-class trends and 
commonalities from past shipping campaigns, which OCRWM could consider when planning for 
the development and operation of a repository transportation system. Note: this paper is for 
analytical and discussion purposes only, and is not an endorsement of, or commitment by, 
OCRWM to follow any of the comments or trends. If OCRWM elects to make such 
commitments at a future time, they will be appropriately documented in formal programmatic 
policy statements, plans and procedures. 
Reviewers examined an extensive study completed in 2003 by DOE’s National Transportation 
Program (NTP), Office of Environmental Management (EM), as well as plans and documents 
related to SNF shipments since issuance of the NTP report. OCRWM examined specific 
planning, business, institutional and operating practices that have been identified by DOE, its 
transportation contractors, and stakeholders as important issues that arise repeatedly. In addition, 
the review identifies lessons learned or activities/actions which were found not to be productive 
to the planning and conduct of SNF shipments (i.e., negative impacts).  
This paper is a “looking back” summary of lessons learned across multiple transportation 
campaigns. Not all lessons learned are captured here, and participants in some of the campaigns 
have divergent opinions and perspectives about which lessons are most critical.  This analysis is 
part of a larger OCRWM benchmarking effort to identify best practices to consider in future 
transportation of radioactive materials (“looking forward”). Initial findings from this 
comprehensive benchmarking analysis are expected to be available in late fall 2006. 
For further information regarding OCRWM’s benchmarking project, please contact Alex 
Thrower, DOE/OCRWM, at (202) 586-7905 or via email: alexander.thrower@rw.doe.gov.
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SCOPE OF THE REVIEW 
Transportation of SNF and HLW is a complex undertaking, involving different regulatory 
regimes, logistical considerations and contingency planning. DOE’s Radioactive Material 
Transportation Practices Manual, DOE M 460.2-1, contains 14 different practices (see Table 1) 
meant to coincide with roughly sequential planning steps, beginning with transportation planning 
and ending with emergency cleanup and recovery. The Practices Manual covers all radioactive 
material shipments undertaken by or for the Department of Energy (excluding air and barge 
shipments and certain national security shipments). Most of the campaigns studied were 
conducted using the practices and guidance in DOE M 460.2-1.
Table 1: Transportation Practices Listed in DOE M 460.2-1 
1. Transportation Planning 
2. Emergency Planning 
3. Projected Shipment Planning Information 
4. Routing
5. Security
6. Carrier/Driver Requirements 
7. Shipment Prenotification 
8. Transportation Operational Contingencies
9. Tracking
10. Inspections
11. Safe Parking
12. Emergency Notification 
13. Emergency Response 
14. Recovery and Cleanup 
Although every aspect of planning and operations is important, for purposes of this review 
OCRWM concentrated on three sub-topics for more detailed study. These topics were selected 
because, while OCRWM shipments may not occur for some years, advance planning and 
decision-making in these areas is happening now, and the transportation program could thus 
benefit significantly from this analysis in the near term. The three sub-topics examined were:  
1. Transportation Business Model—how the logistics functions developed, how they are 
organized, and what factors influence their performance; 
2. Outsourcing—how decisions about logistics outsourcing were made, and how high 
performance is maintained; 
3. Stakeholder Relations—how was trust and confidence in the transportation system built, and 
how have stakeholder interactions evolved over time. 
3
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
The following lists the shipping campaign plans, lessons-learned or other documents which were 
reviewed as part of this study. 
1. Best Practices and Findings for DOE Programs Transporting Spent Nuclear Fuel; Final 
January 2003; prepared by Science Applications International Corporation Energy 
Solutions Group for the U. S. DOE. This paper benchmarks the Radioactive Material 
Transportation Practices Manual (2002) against pre-2003 transportation plans and 
guides for rail and highway shipping campaigns in terms of specific planning and 
programmatic activities for the shipping of radioactive waste. Twelve overall planning 
processes and transportation plans were reviewed and compared against the practices. 
2. West Valley Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment Project Lessons Learned; April 2004 and 
November 2001. On July 17, 2003, the U.S. DOE completed the movement of 125 
commercial SNF assemblies from the West Valley Demonstration Project to the Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). The assemblies were 
transported by rail in two dual-purpose shipping and storage casks and moved 2300 
miles; the shipment arrived ahead of schedule and without incident. Planning, preparation 
and conduct involved four railroads, eleven States, two Tribes and five Federal Railroad 
Administration regions. Input for this document was received from staff in the involved 
railroads, States, Tribes, and the Federal Railroad Administration plus DOE and 
contractor staff. 
3. Lessons Learned Cross Country Transportation Working Group.  This document 
identifies lessons learned during the June 2001 truck shipment of U.S. DOE Foreign 
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel from the Savannah River Site (SRS) to INEEL. 
4. Transportation External Coordination Working Group (TEC) Meeting Summaries. At the 
July 2000 TEC meeting, over 110 participants representing State, Tribal and local 
governments, regional groups, industry and professional organizations, DOE, and other 
Federal agencies met to discuss a variety of issues related to DOE’s radioactive materials 
transportation activities. A subsequent meeting in July 2003 specifically explored best 
practices and lessons learned from business and industry and DOE shipments in order to 
improve DOE shipment practices in the future. Similar discussions were held at the 
September 2004 TEC meeting.  
5. Foreign Research Reactor West Coast Shipment Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation 
External Lessons Learned, October 1998. In July 1998, Training, Research, Isotope, 
General Atomics (TRIGA) SNF was received from South Korea at the Concord Naval 
Weapons Station in California and shipped by rail to the INEEL. The shipment arrived 
without incident. This document was prepared with input from key stakeholders from 
State, local and Tribal agencies from the four corridor states. 
6. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.  Various presentations, papers and documents provided by 
WIPP staff prior to and during a December 2005 OCRWM benchmarking trip to WIPP 
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address various topics, including the WIPP RCRA recertification application, site 
overviews and program updates, evolution of the WIPP transportation program, 
stakeholder communications and public collaborations. Staff also reviewed the WIPP
Transportation Safety Program Implementation Guide, Dec. 2003, published by the 
Western Governors’ Association. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The following summarizes lessons-learned findings which were common across multiple 
transportation campaigns, or those findings which may have unique applicability to future 
OCRWM shipments. Appendix A contains a bulletized list of campaign-specific findings.  
TRANSPORTATION BUSINESS MODEL/TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 
The way in which DOE programs planned and organized shipping campaigns was a central focus 
of discussion and debate, both before and after shipments occurred. Commenters almost 
unanimously observed that DOE has a responsibility to ensure there is frequent and consistent 
communication and coordination among all parties involved; that DOE should share information 
with all agencies helping to plan and execute the shipments; and that DOE should have a 
systematic method of communications among predesignated points-of-contact from every 
involved entity. Keeping points- of -contact lists current, including points- of- contact for states 
and tribes, is one labor-intensive but critical administrative task that can be readily addressed 
with systematic communication. In some cases, problematic issues arose simply because a list 
had an inaccurate telephone listing, such as when someone had retired.   
DOE programs received consistently positive results from holding operational readiness reviews 
with owners, shippers, receiving sites, transportation contractors, and corridor States and Tribes. 
These reviews are used to obtain confirmation that each participant is ready, that unresolved 
issues have been identified and addressed, and that review of all shipping documents has been 
completed.  
Based on the experiences of the various campaigns examined, it appears DOE managers have 
benefited from applying a “prudent business standard”, going beyond specific regulatory 
requirements. By doing so, successful managers have increased stakeholder confidence, avoided 
potential conflict with States and reduced project risks (i.e., avoided delays). DOE programs 
work with a broad range of stakeholders and may receive numerous requests related to 
transportation plans—such as taking (or avoiding) specific routes, avoiding congested areas at 
certain times of day, or using nonstandard equipment. Managers and planners must determine 
whether agreeing to such requests is reasonable, taking into account such factors as (1) cost and 
practicality; (2) actual versus perceived risks, or benefits to safety; and (3) whether a given 
action will set a precedent for future shipments, or contravene past ones. Campaign credibility 
can be undermined if management commits to additional steps that add substantial cost without 
actually enhancing safety. On the other hand, a blanket policy to reject any “above-regulatory” 
request, no matter how minor, may not be reasonable and could itself jeopardize mission success.      
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Regarding the specifics of the planning documents themselves, programs tended to follow a 
standard format with elements described in the DOE M 460.2-1, “Radioactive Material 
Transportation Practices Manual” (see Table 2). Before this manual was issued in September 
2002, other documents, such as the “DOE Program Managers Guide to Transportation 
Planning”, also listed similar plan components.  Programs generally had a higher-level campaign 
plan that was circulated broadly, with more specific topical plans (security, emergency response, 
inspections, communications) having more limited circulation. 
Table 2: Typical Elements of DOE Transportation Plans 
1. Organizational roles and responsibilities 
2. Material to be shipped 
3. Projected shipping window 
4. Estimated number of shipments 
5. Mode of transport and carriers to be used 
6. Packages to be used 
7. Preferred and/or alternative routes 
8. Shipment prenotification 
9. Safe parking arrangements 
10. Tracking systems 
11. Emergency preparedness and response 
12. Recovery and cleanup 
13. Security arrangements 
14. Public Information 
Source: DOE M 460.2-1, 2.2.5, “Transportation Plans” 
For routing issues, programs appeared to benefit by defining a standard approach in identifying 
routes, and then sticking to the plan. Successful programs involved early process coordination 
and discussion with corridor States and Tribes, even if the specific route to be used could not be 
finalized until the shipment date is near. The issue of safety and radiological inspections was a 
common concern, especially in the context of rail operations. Inspections were often logistically 
difficult to arrange when schedules changed or there were multiple inspections over a long route.
Some programs noted that if rigorous inspections at origin and destination points were 
conducted, and the results showed consistently high levels of performance, the numbers of 
inspections might be reduced.  This issue remains a critical one for corridor States, some of 
which require enroute inspections. 
Security continues to be a major concern voiced by all parties involved. Shipment participants 
consistently indicated the need to balance need-to-know security limitations with the need for 
coordination of information. DOE also should ensure all involved parties understand 
requirements for safeguarding information appropriately. Security policies and practices need to 
be consistent. Some participants did not always observe established security procedures (such as 
leaving sensitive information on answering machines). If State police escorts are used for 
shipments, careful planning is needed to schedule “hand-offs” at State borders for truck 
shipments. Some observers urged use of Federal escorts to eliminate potential delays. 
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OUTSOURCING
Campaign participants stressed repeatedly good contract performance requires clarity of terms 
and expectations between the DOE customer and the transportation services provider. Other 
parties such as States may be interested in aspects of this relationship, but they should not be 
interposed between contracting parties because of the potential for confusion or misdirection 
regarding key terms of contract performance and liability. Using checklists as living documents 
to identify responsibilities and to status activities has proven to be valuable. The rail environment 
has unique operating considerations that were not often well understood, which sometimes led to 
confusion, unrealistic expectations or costly changes to plans. One contributor urged DOE to 
develop system-wide tenders rather than contracts with each railroad, which sometimes proved 
cumbersome. Finally, several participants noted that DOE programs frequently underestimated 
how long it would take to complete service negotiations, which can lead to schedule slippage, 
delays and added cost and inconvenience. 
STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS 
Accurate and clear communication with stakeholders was identified by every program as a 
critically important aspect of success. Such efforts worked especially well when tied into a 
robust training program. Most DOE transportation programs supported emergency response 
training in one form or another. Responder training has obvious benefits in preparing 
communities for shipments, but the training process has important additional benefits as well. 
Good, comprehensive and meaningful responder training can serve to “tie” together other 
campaign planning needs. The Office of Environmental Management’s (EM’s) Transportation 
Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP) uses a modular approach to prepare responders, which 
can easily be integrated into existing State and Tribal training programs. Part of that training 
includes public information and education materials, and because local law enforcement and 
response personnel are highly trusted by their constituents they can provide important 
information at a grassroots level about transportation plans and procedures. Also, realistic 
exercises help shippers, carriers, States and Tribes work through how shipments occur and 
unusual events develop, and may themselves be positive news events in a local community. 
Programs often found it helpful to develop and provide resource guides and media packets that 
focused on material-specific information, not campaign-specific information. Basic information 
about radioactive materials transportation has been developed, and shipping programs should use 
those materials to maintain a consistent and accurate stream of information.  Programs should 
work closely with States and Tribes to ensure all information products are accurate and useful. 
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APPENDIX A 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM
CRITICAL BUSINESS PROCESSES FOR THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEM
REFERENCE KEY: 
1. SNF - Best Practices and Findings for DOE Programs Transporting Spent Nuclear Fuel; 
Final January 2003; Prepared by Science Applications International Corporation Energy 
Solutions Group for the U. S. DOE
2. WVSNF - West Valley Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment Project Lessons Learned; April 
2004 and November 2001  
3. CCTWG - Lessons Learned Cross Country Transportation Working Group (June 2001 
shipment) 
4. TEC - Transportation External Coordination Working Group (TEC) meeting summaries;  
a. TEC 1 - July 2000 TEC meeting  
b. TEC 2 – July 2003 TEC meeting 
c. TEC 3 – September 2004 TEC meeting 
5. FRR - Foreign Research Reactor West Coast Shipment Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Transportation External Lessons Learned, October 1998 
6. WIPP – Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (various documents) 
TRANSPORTATION BUSINESS MODEL 
Transportation Planning 
x Use best practices & lessons learned from past shipping campaigns – domestic, 
international & industry (TEC 2). 
x Strive for more consistent, centralized planning by gaining consistency among DOE’s 
programs before consulting with States, Tribes, stakeholders, etc. (TEC 2; WIPP). 
x Freely share information with other agencies and organizations that are helping to plan 
the shipments (SNF; WIPP). 
x Hold  an operational readiness review to include material owner, shipper, receiving site, 
transportation contractors, States and Tribes, and others involved in the shipment to 
ensure concurrence from each participant that they are ready, that unresolved issues have 
been identified and addressed, and that review of all shipping documents has been 
completed, etc. (WVSNF). 
x Need enhanced, ongoing, open communication prior to planning logistics (TEC 2; 
WIPP). 
x Set a firm shipping date that allows adequate time for the carriers to coordinate the 
shipment and maintain that shipping date (WVSNF; FRR; WIPP). 
x Prepare comprehensive operational checklist to ensure activities leading up to shipment 
are completed on time (WVSNF). 
x Ensure frequent and consistent communication and coordination among all parties 
involved (TEC 2; WIPP). 
x Evaluate prudence of meeting higher safety standards than required by regulation 
(WVSNF; TEC 2; WIPP).  
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x Certain circumstances may merit going beyond regulatory requirements, including first 
shipments and sensitive communities; however, caution should be taken not to set 
unreasonable precedents. (TEC 2)
x Work to eliminate excess promises to local jurisdictions that DOE cannot meet. (FRR)
x DOE imposed a significant amount of added requirements on the carriers above and 
beyond the carriers’ normal operations. These requirements are a result of DOE’s 
interactions with the States and Tribes. (WVSNF)
x Minimize the number of requirements imposed on the railroad carriers. This will improve 
negotiating of contracts and prevent requirements being imposed that cannot be met by 
the carriers due to federal regulations and union agreements (WVSNF; FRR). 
x Areas for re-evaluation – Commitments and accommodations beyond regulatory 
requirements (curfew, holidays and special events, highway route controlled quantity 
status for empty shipments, vehicle replacement and servicing, driver standards, etc.).
(WIPP) 
x Advances in physical and tracking technologies need to be factored into transportation 
plans (TEC 2). 
x Need a timeline of arrival & departures that is formula based and easy to manage 
(WVSNF). 
x Prepare a Status Center Guide (WVSNF). 
x For the status center, consider a full complement of telephones, computers, a large staff, 
and using a telephone recording device to ensure all messages are captured properly 
(WVSNF). 
x Consistency is needed in information and messages (TEC 2; WIPP). 
x DOE support crew – select people proficient in public relations and who perform 
multidisciplinary functions (WVSNF). 
x Multiple shipment campaigns that cover years would greatly benefit in development of a 
system-wide process for notifying points of contact in the States, Tribes, railroads, and 
FRA. A secure web-based system that allowed the organizations to update their personnel 
information, telephone numbers, etc., on an ongoing basis would save an enormous 
amount of time and effort. (WVSNF) 
x Perform safety reviews for the installation and removal of the TRANSCOM equipment 
(WVSNF). 
x Strengthen communications with support personnel aboard the train by using cell phones, 
satellite telephones, and best technology available. Specify the uses for each type of 
phone used to communicate with the WCC, local responders, the status center and 
TRANSCOM (WVSNF; SNF; FRR). 
x Work closely and keep in contact with the receiving site (SNF; TEC 3). 
x Use locomotive engines that are commonly used in the area, especially for the point of 
origin to minimize additional interest from locals (i.e., railfans) created by unfamiliar 
locomotives being in the area (WVSNF). 
x Motor carrier drivers need to be fully instructed prior to any shipment regarding the 
route, escort procedures, unplanned stops, communications, and following directions 
from DOE dispatch and local law enforcement agencies (CCTWG). 
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Plans & Documents 
x Incorporate elements of successful transportation plans – don’t reinvent the wheel (TEC 
2).
x All shipments should have transportation plans that describe operational strategies and 
delineate steps. DOE’s transportation plans should be consistent among programs (SNF; 
CCTWG). 
x Transportation plans need to outline the necessary inspections that will take place before, 
during and after shipments and how participants will meet applicable requirements. It 
should describe where, who and what will be inspected (tiedowns, casks, etc.). It should 
describe related policies and plans that complement other required inspections (SNF; 
WVSNF; WIPP). 
x DOE needs to come to resolution on how to handle sensitive information in 
transportation plans, while still allowing them to be useful (WVSNF). 
x The transportation plan should ensure that the security plan is coordinated among the 
necessary parties (SNF). 
x Transportation plans should provide contact lists and describe 1) the type of information 
to be provided during the notification process; 2) who has the overall responsibility for 
making the notification; 3) the coordination between the carrier, shipper and the receiver 
site to ensure that necessary notifications are made (SNF; CCTWG). 
x Transportation plan should clearly delineate what constitutes a notification; how 
notifications will be made; and how DOE, State and Tribal authorities and other Federal 
agencies, if required, will be notified in the event of an emergency (SNF; CCTWG). 
x Transportation plan should state what pre-notifications will occur and how they will be 
transmitted as required by regulations and agreements. Plan should include how DOE 
intends to keep up with changes of State administrations, including staff turnover (SNF). 
x Transportation plans should cover pre-notifications and emergency notifications. 
(WVSNF). 
x DOE Transportation plans should be coordinated with carrier’s notification plans (SNF). 
x Transportation plan changes from previous revisions should be highlighted for ease in 
review by States/Tribes. (CCTWG) 
x Prepare a package of DOE support crew documentation (to include key documents and 
instructions such as shipping papers, maps, charts, DOE support crew instructions, survey 
forms, TRANSCOM plan, railroad release forms, etc.) for use during the shipment. 
(WVSNF; TEC; WIPP). 
x Prepare standard plans (i.e., Emergency Preparedness Coordination Plan, Public 
Communications Plan) for all DOE material shipments (i.e., SNF, etc.) (WVSNF; SNF) 
x Prepare a comprehensive operational contingency plan that includes how States and 
Tribes will be involved; contingencies for weather and adverse road/track conditions and 
what provisions will be made in the event of unplanned detours, unscheduled delays, 
accidents, vehicle breakdown, and threats against the shipment; identify who is 
responsible for authorizing use of alternate routes and which DOE authority and others 
need to be notified. If the carrier develops the operational contingency plan, it should 
receive prior approval from DOE (SNF; WIPP). 
x Distribute all documents at the same time to ensure better integration (WVSNF; SNF; 
CCTWG).  
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x The DOE transportation plan and the motor carrier plan need to include some type of 
contingency actions to be taken by the motor carrier in the event of a delay by the escorts 
(CCTWG).
x Request that States and Tribes provide a telephone number that is staffed 24 hours/day, 7 
days/week to ensure notifications are effectively sent and received with a minimal 
number of changes (WVSNF). 
Routing
x Routing of shipments should not be disclosed; it should be protected information 
(WVSNF; SNF). 
x Follow standardized approach for all planned route selections. Flexibility is key 
component of planning (SNF; TEC 2; WIPP). 
x Coordinated and integrated planning with representatives from State, Tribal and local 
governments, and carriers, should be conducted to identify the appropriate route early in 
the planning process (SNF; WIPP). 
x Identify routes early allowing sufficient time for training (TEC 2; WIPP). 
Inspections – Rail 
x If railroad equipment is delivered at another location, consider 1) inspection of railroad 
equipment by FRA inspector in the rail yard where preventive maintenance was 
performed; 2) make provisions for performing emergency repairs to railcars after delivery 
(WVSNF). 
x Perform thorough receipt inspection of the railcars (other equipment) as early as possible 
(WVSNF). 
x Radiological inspections by multiple agencies cause excessive delay (FRR). 
x Standardize the preshipment radiological inspection; conduct it sufficiently in advance of 
the planned shipment to allow distribution to all involved parties; and use it as the 
cornerstone of the confirmatory inspections (WVSNF). 
x Eliminate the need to plan specific enroute locations for radiological inspections by State 
and Tribal agencies. Establish a way to address current state and tribal requirements to 
more efficiently conduct radiological monitoring (WVSNF). 
Security
x All involved parties must understand requirements for safeguarding information. This 
needs to be included in the transportation plans and discussed during the planning calls 
(WVSNF; CCTWG; WIPP). 
x Security plan should identify all requirements applicable to the shipment. Balance the 
need to coordinate information with need-to-know (WVSNF; SNF; TEC 1; TEC 2; 
WIPP). 
x The security plan should take into consideration the assessments that have been 
performed by DOE and external organizations of possible security threats against 
shipments, as applicable (SNF). 
x Communication of sensitive shipment information should only be provided to designated 
individuals with need-to-know. Sensitive information should not be left on recording 
devices (WVSNF; FRR; SNF). 
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x Ensure there are consistent security communication policies for disseminating sensitive 
information effectively. Investigate using secure telephone lines when sensitive 
information needs to be relayed (WVSNF; WIPP). 
x Ensure all parties receiving sensitive and/or Official Use Only (OUO) information know 
the definition of sensitive information and OUO, and provide guidance on how to 
disseminate and handle sensitive and OUO materials (WVSNF). 
x Communication and security should be evaluated differently for highly visible shipments 
(TEC 2). 
x The receiving site’s security office must work with the shipper, NRC and local law 
enforcement to establish safe parking areas on either side of State borders where escorts 
are required to hand-off or receive shipments (CCTWG). 
x Consider use of Federal Marshals as shipment escorts (WVSNF). 
x Balance security with information dissemination – provide the right information to the 
right people (WVSNF; TEC 2; WIPP). 
OUTSOURCING
General Considerations 
x Prepare checklists for each supplier/contractor and use as living documents to identify 
activities for which each party is responsible, and to track the status of each activity 
(SNF; WVSNF; TEC 2). 
x Begin outsourcing process early because it often takes longer than expected (WVSNF; 
TEC 2; WIPP). 
Rail
x Award a technical contract and a separate freight contract to the railroads. Distinguish the 
scope of each and discuss thoroughly each item in the technical contract (WVSNF). 
x A minimum of two years should be allocated to negotiate a basic agreement and even 
longer for complex shipments (WVSNF). 
x Negotiation of a system-wide tender rate with key railroad carriers for making SNF 
shipments over the major routes is highly suggested (WVSNF). 
x Clearly understand the operations of railroads to maximize the potential benefits of 
moving SNF by rail. Rail is significantly different than truck transport (WVSNF).
STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS 
Training
x Provide training and support for responders, law enforcement and emergency 
management agencies. Training of first responders has been successful (TEC 2; WIPP). 
x Training for shippers, States, Tribes, carriers, etc. should include realistic exercises (TEC 
3).
x Provide assistance based on determining incremental risk-based needs (FRR; WIPP). 
x Follow-up to ensure responder training funding is used appropriately (TEC 2; WIPP). 
x Ensure emergency responders are trained at all levels for the type of shipment being 
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planned (TEC 2). 
x Training exercises need to be realistic, security sensitive, and should be used as a best 
practice (TEC 2). 
x Coordinate with other Federal agency training programs (TEC 2). 
x To mitigate possible conflicts if an alternate route becomes necessary, DOE, States and 
Tribes should consider broadening the training being provided (TEPP’s MERRTT) to 
include alternate routes. The goal should be to eventually integrate radioactive materials 
training into general responder training for hazardous materials (WVSNF; FRR; TEC 1 
and 2). 
x Increase the TEPP’s role to prepare for upcoming shipments along existing or new 
corridors to ensure on-going preparedness of States and Tribes (WVSNF; TEC 1). 
x Consistency is needed in information and messages (TEC 2; WIPP). 
Stakeholder/Public Expectations 
x All plans (Transportation, Communication, etc.) should be formatted to meet the National 
Transportation Program’s format (easier for States and Tribes to review) (WVSNF). 
x Keep information in notifications to States and Tribes to a minimum (i.e., shipment dates, 
shipment departure, when shipment crosses state and tribal boundaries, etc.) (WVSNF). 
x Work through State regional groups and TEPP functions (WVSNF; WIPP). 
x  Develop and provide resource guides and media packets. Focus on material-specific 
information, not campaign-specific resource guides (WVSNF; WIPP). 
x Establish points-of-contact for DOE, States and Tribes for all DOE transportation issues 
(TEC 2). 
x Properly identify the scope or level of interest in the campaign or shipping schedule, 
enlisting the assistance of State, Tribal and regional points of contact at the start and 
throughout the campaign (SNF). 
x Make use of existing resources. (SNF). 
x Provide accurate information written for the target audience (SNF; WIPP). 
x Freely share information with other agencies, States, Tribes and organizations that are 
helping to plan shipments (SNF; WIPP). 
x Stakeholders were prepared for and appropriately informed of the safe and secure 
transport of the shipment (FRR; WIPP). 
x DOE should designate speakers based on the issues, regions, phases (single source), and 
have technical experts trained to communicate information in reasonable language. (TEC 
2)
x DOE should use States, Tribes and local personnel to ensure safe shipping.
Communications should go through trusted local officials including the local fire chief or 
other local emergency personnel. (TEC 2)
x DOE should identify stakeholders and get them involved in a two-way dialogue. This will 
dispel rumors and build credibility. DOE needs to ensure that the right mix of planners is 
involved including radiation workers, public workers, urban planners, etc. Other trusted 
people include the port authorities, labor unions, and other local emergency personnel. 
(TEC 2)
x DOE should identify stakeholders and get them involved in a two-way dialogue to help 
dispel rumors and build credibility (TEC 2; WIPP). 
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x Public awareness training greatly turned perceptions to positive. Increase the public 
understanding of the transport of radioactive materials and proven safety of shipping 
procedures to lessen public concerns which led to general acceptance of the transport. 
(FRR; WVSNF; TEC 1, 2, and 3) 
Emergency Planning
x Prepare contingency plan to provide mitigation & recovery actions for each potential 
incident. Keep response to incident systematic. Identify who’s involved, and who’s 
responsible (WVSNF; SNF; WIPP). 
x Freely share information with other agencies and organizations that are helping to plan 
the shipments (SNF; WIPP). 
x Use consistent approach to planning for emergency response. Use TEPP tools (SNF; 
WIPP). 
x Make use of existing resources (SNF). 
x Ensure everyone knows who is responsible and who has what responsibilities (TEC 3; 
FRR; WIPP). 
x A point-of-contact for archaeological purposes should be identified in the event of a 
recovery/cleanup being required on Tribal land (TEC 3).  
x Increase the TEPP role as a proactive system to prepare for upcoming shipments along 
existing or new corridors to ensure on-going preparedness of States and Tribes 
(WVSNF). 
x Prepare a comprehensive operational contingency plan that includes how States and 
Tribes will be involved; contingencies for weather and adverse road/track conditions and 
what provisions will be made in the event of unplanned detours, unscheduled delays, 
accidents, vehicle breakdown, and threats against the shipment; identify who is 
responsible for authorizing use of alternate routes and which DOE authority and others 
need to be notified. If the carrier develops the operational contingency plan, it should 
receive prior approval from DOE. (SNF). 
x Establish clear chain of responsibilities (TEC 3; WIPP). 
x Have a backup plan in the event the Homeland Security Threat Level changes before a 
shipment or during a shipment (i.e., contingency plan) (TEC 2). 
x Monitor the Internet to maintain cognizance of the information being viewed by rail fans 
and other members of the public (WVSNF). 
x Have backup procedures in the event the TRANSCOM system is down (i.e., contingency 
plan) (WVSNF; TEC 2; FRR; CCTWG). 
x Identify alternate safe parking in the event of weather, accident, etc. situations (i.e., 
contingency plan) (SNF; WIPP). 
x The receiving site’s security office must work with the shipper, NRC and local law 
enforcement to establish safe parking areas on either side of a state border where escorts 
are required in the state to be entered (CCTWG). 
NOTE:  The lessons learned contained in this document have been summarized from 
review of documents identified on page 8, Reference Key.  For electronic copies of these 
documents, please contact Marsha Keister (marsha.keister@inl.gov) or Kathy McBride 
(kathryn.mcbride@inl.gov).
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